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aBstract
We employed a behavior-analytic analog of the sunk cost effect in which all 
trials started out with a short expected ratio to an imaginary monetary reward, 
but some trials assumed a longer expected ratio part way through the trial. 
subjects had the (preferable) option of “escaping” the trial if the longer ex-
pected ratio had come into effect in order to bring on a new trial that again had 
a short expected ratio. With a between-subjects design we tested whether the 
presence of discriminative stimuli correlated with the expected ratios would 
affect escaping behavior. in one condition, such stimuli were present; in the 
other condition, they were absent. Subjects persisted significantly more in the 
condition where discriminative stimuli were absent.
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resumen
se empleó un análogo analítico-conductual del efecto de costo hundido, en 
el cual todos los ensayos iniciaron con una razón esperada corta respecto 
a una recompensa monetaria imaginaria, pero algunos ensayos adquirieron 
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una razón esperada más larga durante parte del ensayo. los sujetos tenían 
la opción (preferible) de “escapar” del ensayo si la razón esperada más larga 
estaba en efecto, para iniciar un nuevo ensayo que de nuevo tuviera una 
razón esperada corta. con un diseño entre sujetos, se probó si la presen-
cia de estímulos discriminativos correlacionados con las razones esperadas 
afectarían la conducta de escapar. en una condición, tales estímulos estaban 
presentes; en la otra condición, estaban ausentes. los sujetos persistieron 
significativamente más en la condición en la cual los estímulos discriminati-
vos estaban ausentes.
Palabras clave: efecto de costo hundido
the sunk cost effect is the increased tendency to persist in an endeavor once 
an investment of money, time, or effort has been made. this effect appears 
to apply to two different decision contexts, known as adoption decisions and 
progress decisions. the effect is of interest to psychologists because, in the 
case of both types of decisions, sunk costs may lead people to behave in a 
non-optimal manner. for example, adoption decisions involve the choice of 
which of several already-purchased items to consume. the sunk cost effect is 
manifested in the adoption decision by the consumption of the most expensi-
ve item despite it having a utility less than or equal to any of the less-expensi-
ve items (arkes, 1996; arkes & Blumer, 1985). Progress decisions involve the 
choice of whether to continue pouring investments toward an ongoing course 
of action. in a common procedure subjects read a hypothetical scenario in 
which they have spent a certain amount of money towards a project that now 
appears to have bleak chances for success, and they must decide whether 
to continue funding the project (e.g., arkes & Blumer, 1985; garland, 1990; 
Garland & Newport, 1991). The basic finding in these studies is that the like-
lihood of persistence increases as sunk cost — i.e., the money spent so far 
— increases. 
to date, the majority of the research on the sunk cost effect has involved 
college students and questionnaire-type procedures, and most interpreta-
tions of the sunk cost effect have come from cognitive and social psychology 
frameworks. the most widely-discussed theories that have been used to ac-
count for this phenomenon are self-justification (Staw, 1976), prospect theory 
(Whyte, 1986), and a desire to avoid waste (arkes & Blumer, 1985). despite 
the social and cognitive slant of most conceptions of the sunk cost effect, 
research from several laboratories, including our own, has been exploring 
the sunk cost effect using a behavior-analytic framework. this research has 
provided important contributions to our understanding of the effect, in large 
part by highlighting the importance of some previously-ignored variables. for 
example, research by goltz (1992, 1993, 1999) and by Bragger and her asso-
ciates (Bragger, Bragger, hantula, & Kirnan, 1998; Bragger, Bragger, hantula, 
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Kirnan, & Kutcher, 2003) has suggested that reinforcement history plays a role 
in determining how long we persist in a losing financial endeavor. In particular, 
subjects with a prior history of intermittent reinforcement will throw more (hy-
pothetical) money at a losing venture, e.g. a fading stock, than subjects with a 
prior history of continuous reinforcement. goltz has suggested that the partial 
reinforcement extinction effect and behavioral momentum may often lie at the 
root of such persistence. thus, the sunk cost effect may not necessarily be an 
“irrational” behavior—rather, we may persist in a fruitless endeavor because 
we have not learned that persistence is non-optimal.
Recent work from our laboratory has highlighted this general point in a 
different manner. first of all, we have developed a more stripped-down be-
havior-analytic analog of the effect. one of our goals was to have an analog 
of this maladaptive behavior that would allow us to explore the effect in non-
humans as well as humans, in hopes of determining the degree to which this 
behavior is general across species. a second goal was to have a procedure 
that would allow us to explore the sunk effect in more general terms in order to 
evaluate stimulus-response relationships present in sunk cost situations.
Our first study used the analog with pigeons and humans (Navarro & 
fantino, 2005), and suggested that persistence in a losing venture may oc-
cur when an organism is unable to discriminate when the venture is losing. 
Pigeons were placed individually in an operant chamber in which they could 
peck either of two keys: a “reward” key colored white, or an “escape” key dis-
playing a white “x”. college students were presented with an analogous task 
on a computer console. for a large number of trials, the subjects had to peck 
(or press) the reward key an undetermined number of times until they received 
a reward. at any time they could respond on the escape key to cancel the cur-
rent trial and initiate a new one. a new trial began either after one response 
to the escape key or after a reward (food for the pigeon, money for the col-
lege student). the reward key modeled a course of action that started off with 
favorable prospects but turned unfavorable: it offered a diminishing chance 
of reward as responses incremented. in other words, as subjects responded 
without getting a reward, the amount of work remaining for reward became 
increasingly large. for example, in one condition the “reward” key operated 
on one of four fixed-ratio (FR) schedules: on 1/2 the trials, the schedule was 
FR 10; on 1/4 of the trials, the schedule was FR 40; on 1/8 of the trials, the 
schedule was FR 80; and on 1/8 of the trials, the schedule was FR 160. The 
expected ratio remaining to reward therefore increased through a trial in the 
following manner: at the start of a trial the expected ratio was 45. after the 
10th response, if no reinforcement occurred (because the schedule in effect 
happened to be one of the three longer ratios) the expected ratio increased 
to 70. after the 40th response, if no reinforcement occurred, the expected 
ratio increased to 80. after the 80th response, if no reinforcement occurred, 
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the expected ratio remained at 80. a subject’s optimal strategy was to escape 
after 10 responses to the reward key, thereby lowering the expected ratio 
from 70 to 45. notice that this procedure corresponds to a “progress deci-
sion”—subjects undertake a course of action and subsequently may either 
continue pouring investments into that course of action or instead move on to 
a new one.
in that study, we manipulated two variables that we expected could af-
fect the level of persistence. one was the arithmetic difference between the 
expected ratio of escaping after responding the number of times required by 
the shortest fR (in the above example, 10 times) and persisting past that 
point. in the condition described above, this difference is 24 {24 = 70-(45+1 
response to the escape key)}. By changing the fR values and probabilities, 
we created a second condition in which the difference was 44, and a third 
condition in which the difference was only 19. Both pigeon and human sub-
jects showed the following trend: when the difference between the expected 
ratio of escaping and persisting was small, subjects tended to persist; when 
the difference was large, subjects tended to escape, i.e., behave optimally. 
As the contingencies were made more difficult to discriminate, persistence 
tended to increase. 
We performed a second manipulation that also examined this point, but 
only with pigeon subjects. We manipulated whether or not discriminative stim-
uli were present that were correlated with the expected ratio remaining to re-
ward. in one condition the stimulus on the reward key never changed through-
out a trial. in the other condition, the stimulus on the reward key changed with 
each increment of the expected ratio. at the start of a trial, the reward key was 
white; after the 10th response, the key turned red; after the 40th response, the 
key turned blue; and after the 80th response, the key turned green. the data 
are shown here in table 1. as expected, when these discriminative stimuli 
were present, pigeons selected optimally. When the key light changed after 
10 non-rewarded responses, the pigeons immediately selected the escape 
key, initiating a new trial. When these discriminative stimuli were absent, how-
ever, only one of four pigeons selected optimally. the remaining three pigeons 
consistently persisted in responding on the food key until food was ultimately 
(and arduously) obtained. these results, like those from the experiment ma-
nipulating the expected ratios, indicate that a determinant of persistence is an 
organism’s ability to discriminate when conditions have deteriorated. 
In the present study, we set out to expand upon those findings by repeat-
ing the latter experiment—the one manipulating the presence or absence of 
discriminative stimuli—with human subjects. to what extent would the be-
havior of human subjects be affected by this manipulation? We employed the 
same basic procedure we used with the pigeons, but with pressing a com-
puter key as the operant and money as the reinforcer.
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methoD
subjects. 68 undergraduate men and women participated in this study for 
course credit.
apparatus. four iBM-compatible computers programmed in turbo Pas-
cal. the four computers were located in a small room and were separated by 
partitions.
Procedure. subjects faced a computer task in which they had to respond 
on a keyboard in order to earn imaginary money. the instructions indicated 
the following: 1) the session would last 30 minutes; 2) the main task was to 
earn as much money as possible, and the money was hypothetical; 3) during 
a trial, subjects could either press “l”, followed by enteR, an undetermined 
number of times until the screen flashed a $1 reward, or press “K”, followed by 
enteR, to cancel that trial and initiate a new one. subjects moved from the 
instruction screen to the actual procedure by pressing enteR. 
as subjects responded during a trial, the key instructions appeared on 
the top left of the screen; the words “no money yet…” appeared at the center 
of the screen, and the total earnings for the session appeared at the bottom 
right of the screen. On every trial, one of four fixed-ratio (FR) schedules was 
in effect on the reward key. On 1/2 the trials, the schedule was FR 10; on 1/4 
session of 
stable period Bird 361 Bird 362 Bird 363 Bird 364
stimulus 
changes 
present**
session 1 0% 0% 0% 0%
session 2 0% 0% 0% 0%
session 3 0% 0% 0% 0%
session 4 0% 0% 0% 0%
session 5 0% 0% 0% 0%
stimulus 
changes absent
session 1 3% 100% 97% 100%
session 2 4% 100% 100% 100%
session 3 1% 100% 100% 100%
session 4 1% 100% 100% 100%
session 5 2% 100% 100% 100%
table 1. from navarro & fantino (2005), experiment 1: Percentage of 
trials With Persistence*
*Persistence in a trial is defined as completion of that trial (excluding FR 
10 trials)
**The data for the first 5-8 sessions of this condition were lost because 
of a computer malfunction. The data shown here are from the first 5 sessions 
for which data are available. for this reason it is unknown for each pigeon 
whether “Session 1” is truly the first session of the stable period or is instead 
subsequent to the first session of the stable period
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of the trials, the schedule was FR 40; on 1/8 of the trials, the schedule was FR 
80; and on 1/8 of the trials, the schedule was FR 160. A random number gen-
erator determined the ordering of trials within successive eight-trial blocks, 
meaning that in every block of eight trials the fR 10 occurred four times, the 
fR 40 occurred two times, and the fR 80 and fR 160 each occurred once. 
each trial lasted until the reinforcement schedule was completed or until the 
trial was canceled.
upon completion of an fR schedule, the screen went blank and the sen-
tence “you won $1!” appeared at the center of the screen for 2 s. Then, the 
sentence “new trial begins in a moment” appeared at the center of the screen 
for 2 s, after which the main screen reappeared with the total earnings incre-
mented appropriately. if a subject canceled a trial, the screen went blank and 
the sentence “new trial begins in a moment” appeared at the center of the 
screen for 2 s, followed by the main screen. 
subjects were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: either stimu-
lus-changes-absent or stimulus-changes-present. in the changes-absent 
condition, all characters presented on the monitor were white in color over 
a black background. in the changes-present condition, at the start of a trial 
the characters were white and the word “white” appeared at the bottom of 
the screen. after the 10th reward-key response, if no reinforcement occurred, 
all characters became red and the word “red” appeared at the bottom of the 
screen. after the 40th reward-key response, if no reinforcement occurred, all 
characters became blue and the word “blue” appeared at the bottom of the 
screen. after the 80th reward-key response, if no reinforcement occurred, all 
characters became green and the word “green” appeared at the bottom of the 
screen. screens that designated reinforcement or the delay to the next trial 
always displayed white characters.
one to four subjects performed the experiment simultaneously depending 
on how many subjects had happened to sign up for a given time slot. subjects 
were asked to complete two 30-minute sessions. subjects could schedule the 
two sessions back-to-back or up to one week apart. the number of trials per 
session differed between subjects but was typically between 50 and 100 trials.
results
forty-one subjects participated in the changes-absent condition, and 37 sub-
jects participated in the changes-present condition. only 39 and 29 subjects, 
respectively, completed two sessions of each condition. the focus of the data 
analysis was on second-session behavior. We defined persistence as com-
pletion of one of the three longer ratios, i.e. fR 40, fR 80, and fR 160 (we did 
not count completion of an fR 10 as persistence since completion of that ratio 
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is optimal). table 2 shows the percentage of trials (in which persistence was 
possible) that were completed, ordered in each condition from the subject 
with the lowest persistence to the subject with the highest persistence. in the 
changes-absent condition, the average percentage of trials with persistence 
was 56.9% (sd = 45.97). in the changes-present condition, the average per-
centage was 34.8% (SD = 42.50). A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant 
effect of condition on the percentage of trials with persistence, f (1, 66) = 
4.09, p < .05. 
condition
individual data, ordered from subject with 
lowest second session datum to subject with 
highest second session datum
Mean sd
stimulus-changes-
absent
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 16, 36, 45, 
56, 70, 90, 94, 96, 97, 97, 100, 100, 100, 100, 
100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 
100, 100
56.9 45.97
stimulus-changes-
present
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 4, 4, 6, 9, 19, 28, 
41, 48, 49, 94, 96, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100 34.8 42.50
table 2. Percentage of trials with Persistence, second session*
*Persistence in a trial is defined as completion of any but an FR 10 trial.
Behavior was more optimal in the second session than in the first session. 
In the changes-absent condition, the level of persistence in the first session 
was 67.7% (sd = 39.72). in the changes-present condition, the level of per-
sistence was 45.7% (SD = 41.03). Thus, from the first to the second session 
the level of persistence in both conditions decreased by about 10 percentage 
points.
in both conditions, the second-session data show a bimodal pattern in 
which the majority of subjects either persisted regularly or escaped regularly, 
as shown in figure 1. We may label the subjects who persisted in at least 90% 
of the trials as “persisters”, and the subjects who persisted in under 10% of 
the trials as “escapers”. in the changes-absent condition, 50% of the subjects 
were persisters while 35% were escapers. in the changes-present condition, 
the number of persisters decreased to 27.5% while the number of escapers 
increased to 56%.
A significant proportion of the subjects never responded on the escape 
key during either session. in the changes-absent condition, this was 14 out of 
39 subjects; in the changes-present condition, this was 2 out of 29 subjects. 
We address this issue in the discussion.
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Discussion
in the present research we explored the effect of discriminative stimuli on 
persistence in a non-optimal course of action. We employed a procedure we 
had developed in our previous research in which subjects had to respond a 
certain number of times to obtain a reward, but as responses mounted the 
average number of responses left to reward increased. the optimal behavior 
was to “escape” (i.e., move on to the next trial) after the minimum possible 
response requirement had been met without reward. in a prior study with 
pigeon subjects, we manipulated the presence or absence of discriminative 
stimuli correlated with the expected ratio left to reward (navarro & fantino, 
2005). We found that all pigeons behaved optimally when discriminative sti-
muli were present, but when discriminative stimuli were absent most of the 
pigeons persisted to the end of every trial. the present experiment repeated 
this manipulation with human subjects. The results are similar to our prior fin-
ding with pigeon subjects—the presence of discriminative stimuli led to more 
optimal behavior.
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1.  Histogram of the degrees of persistence. 
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We note that the behavior of the human subjects in the present experi-
ment was quite variable, as evidenced by the high standard deviation in each 
condition and by the variety in the individual data shown in table 2. a potential 
reason for this variety is that two sessions were not enough to allow behavior 
to become stable for all subjects. indeed, in our prior study with pigeon sub-
jects, the pigeons underwent far more sessions before their data were stable 
and therefore analyzed. another potential reason for the variability in these 
data is our use of imaginary money as the reinforcer. it is plausible that some 
subjects were sufficiently motivated by this reinforcer while others were not. 
despite these two procedural issues, our results indicate that, at least initially, 
human subjects are more likely to persist in a non-optimal course of action if 
no discriminative stimuli are available to signal changes in the contingency. 
one issue of potential concern is the result that many subjects—nearly one 
quarter of them, but mostly in the changes-absent condition—never once con-
tacted the escape key. one could argue that since these subjects never directly 
contacted the escape contingency, it would not be meaningful to label their per-
sistence as non-optimal. the counter-argument is that the instructions discussed 
the function of the escape key, and during the trials the screen always displayed, 
“press K, followed by enteR, to reset the trial”.  it seems unlikely that the ex-
treme persisters were unaware of the escape key function. therefore, we be-
lieve it is meaningful to label their persistence as non-optimal.
the present research taken together with our prior research suggests 
the following cause of persistence in a non-optimal endeavor: the failure to 
discriminate when the endeavor has become non-optimal. if the contingen-
cies of reinforcement are salient, then both pigeons and humans will behave 
in a manner that maximizes profit. On the other hand if the contingencies are 
not salient, then pigeons and humans will tend to persist in whatever course 
of action they are engaged in. in essence, pigeons and humans tend to stick 
with a particular course of action until they can discriminate the fact that other 
options are more profitable. 
We should mention that the present experiment also represents a novel 
way of studying choice under diminishing returns. others have studied this 
type of choice behavior by programming a concurrent progressive ratio (or 
interval) — fixed ratio (or interval) schedule, whereby completion of the fixed 
ratio results in a resetting of the progressive ratio (hackenberg & hineline, 
1992; hodos & trumbule, 1967). the progressive ratio key is analogous to 
our reward key since the value diminishes over time, and the fixed ratio key is 
analogous to our escape key. however, there is a crucial difference between 
the two procedures: in a progressive schedule, the ratio (or interval) increases 
after every reinforcement, whereas in our procedure the schedule—from a 
subject’s perspective—increased during a trial and was reset after reinforce-
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ment. the two procedures are not truly comparable, which precludes us from 
discussing our results in terms of previous findings in this area.
finally, our research and that of others (goltz, 1992, 1993, 1999; Bragger 
et al., 1998; Bragger et al., 2003) suggest that behavior analysis may be a 
useful method of exploring the sunk cost effect. This research has identified 
several variables important to the effect, most notably reinforcement history 
and discriminative stimuli. We are confident that continued use of the behav-
ior-analytic method may lead to the discovery of additional variables relevant 
to this maladaptive behavior and a more complete understanding of why we 
sometimes “throw good money after bad”.
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